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INTRODUCTION 
This work was chosen out of the interest to hightlight the 
basic principles for the realization of true and authentic freedom. 
We notice that today «freedom» as a concept, assumes a negative 
connotation: an absolute rejection of authority, abolition of law 
—natural and supernatural—, and refusal to any kind of subjection 
either in the public or private and domestic life. 
Also the liberal philosophy of individualism and absolute 
refusal to admit any control proceeding from any other than 
ourselves is now predominant. This false concept has corrupted 
the minds of people and therefore enemical to true and authentic 
practice of freedom. It becomes necessary to redirect our minds 
once more to the true meaning and realization of freedom, and 
the works of Simon in this context are attractive since his prin-
ciples with regard to attainment of freedom are in consonant with 
the christian mind or notion of freedom. 
We begin with the biobliography of Yves René Simon 
(1903-1961), the socio-political situation and influences on his 
thought. He was influenced in his political thoughts by St. 
Thomas, Aristotle and Jacques Maritain. He grew up in an era of 
change after the 1st and 2nd world wars, when liberalism with its 
attendant false conceptions about freedom, free choice, democracy 
and authority were spreading fast. And he therefore set forth to 
correct some of these false conceptions. 
He defined freedom positively as, the power to make a 
choice between the means offered to our activity. It takes place 
in a deliberate action rather than by chance and therefore ex-
perienced when we feel we are dominating a situation. He 
brought out intrinsic elements of freedom which he describes as 
superdetermination, autonomy and free choice. 
Freedom as superdetermination is characterized by a 
unidirectional choice. Here we take a look at two types of 
freedom: 
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a) Initial freedom which is the capacity to choose either the 
good or the bad. 
b) Terminal freedom which is the disposition that enables 
one to choose the good only. It is found in the agent who is 
both free and autonomous, i. e., in the agent who has made the 
good internal and the law has become interior to him and rules 
him from within. 
Freedom of autonomy is «constituted by the presence of law 
within liberty». Autonomy in this context is achieved in the pro-
cess of interiorization of the law, i. e., when one respects the law 
so deeply as to want it to get hold of his innermost self. For 
Simon this interiorization is effected positively in the exercise of 
ones rationality and willingly chooses the proper means that leads 
to ones rational end as a human being. 
Freedom of Choice has two meanings 
a) It implies that the choice is free from impediments or 
coercion and is made between alternatives. It has the characteristic 
of initial freedom and open to error. 
b) The freedom of choice which precludes the possibility of 
error or falsehood, Simon calls Terminal freedom. This is free 
choice properly so called because the volition of the end contains 
the choice of the means. Freedom of choice here has attained to 
the purity of its ideas, the predominant inclination of the will no 
longer conflicts but spontaneously agrees with the precepts of the 
law that has become interior to the will. 
The common good, particular good and the volition of the 
common good are also treated. In the context of our use of the 
common good, it signifies the political common good, the last end 
in the political order. Common good cannot be established, 
preserved or augmented except through a concordance of wills 
and concerted action of all; therefore authority is needed. 
Simon defined authority as an active power resident in a 
person and exercised through command. Authority performs 
essential functions to assure the unity of action of plurality of 
men in the pursuit of their common good, therefore as a cause 
of united action exercises essential function made necessary not by 
evil or deficiency but by the nature of common action. 
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After a careful comparison between democratic ideals with 
socialistic, communist ic , totalitarianistic and liberalistic ideologies, 
it was discovered that the phi losohy of democracy is sufficiently 
flexible to permit the incorporation of many of the better features 
of other systems into democratic government. 
Christianity on her part values this system in as much as it 
continues to ensure the realization of these genuine ideals and 
guarantee to the governed the possibility both of electing and 
holding accountable those w h o govern them and of replacing 
them through peaceful means when appropriate. 
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AUTHORITY ACCORDING 
TO 
YVES RENE SIMON 
N o matter w h o we are, or what we are, where ever w e may 
live, we find ourselves within a structure of authority that limits, 
sustains, and incorporates whatever freedom we may have. Man 
everywhere sets up authority or at least is subject to it. Authori ty 
is present in all phases of social life. 
T h e issue of authority is always very sensitive in the discu-
sión of democracy especially as it is confused with force and in-
dentified with absolutism and exploitation by liberalists. M o r e 
often than not people question the essence of authority in a 
democratic government and efforts are most of the time geared 
toward minimizing it in the society. Clouded by the confusion 
about the nature of authority, an unfruitful dialogue goes from 
time to t ime between authority and freedom and often all the em-
phasis falls on freedom. What is then this authority and how 
should it control? Should there be any authority to which all 
others should be subordinated, a political authority or a a divine 
authority or a pure authority such as we have in reason or in law 
of nature? These and many more questions come into mind 
whenever the issue of author i ty is ment ioned in democrat ic 
discursions. 
This w o r k will be dedicated to discussion on authority 
bringing out as much as possible the posit ion of S imon as regards 
the necessity of authority in our society. In other words , that 
authority is indispensible in our social structure and calls for a 
profound understanding of its functions and therefore establishing 
and accepting its «being» in our society. 
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l. D E F I N I T I O N O F A U T H O R I T Y 
Authority in the general acceptance of the term signifies a 
relation. This relation may obtain between a person and a thing 
just as we speak of the authority of a book. In a stricter sense, 
authority signifies a relation between persons just as we have 
paternal authority expressed in relation between parents and 
children. 
For Yves Simon, authority is «an active power resident in a 
person and exercised through command, i.e., through a practical 
judgment to be taken as a rule of conduct by the free-will of 
another person*. 1 From this definition it follows that authority 
is not impersonal, one must execute it. Authority is a power and 
therefore it appertains to the order of operation. We must men-
tion here earlier the common mistake made respect to the iden-
tification of authority with its instruments of functions. Authority 
is often identified with coercion which is but the most con-
spicuous of its instruments. This is so because among the purposes 
that the civil government serves, the most obvious and conse-
quently the best known is the repression of evil doers. The power 
of unconditional coercion as observed by Simon, is often treated 
as the defining feature of the state. This makes as if evil alone 
would cause the state to be necessary. But coercion is only one 
indtrument of civil government; a great deal of civil direction is 
accomplished through another instrument-persuasion which for 
Simon «would be the only instrument of government in a society 
of ideally perfect people*. 2 
For St. Thomas, authority may be defined from the moral 
point of view as «a relation between a person as ruler and another 
as subject*. 3 It is implied here in the sense that one person by 
his command, moves the will of another to act for an end. This 
end may be for the good of the individual or of the society in 
general. In this case, we can further define authority according to 
Henry Peschke as; «the superiority of a person by which he is en-
titled to make demands on others for the sake of their individual 
good or that of the society*. 4 The superiority of the person may 
be based on a person's intellectual, professional skill, mature 
character, or form a spefcial charism of leadership. It may also be 
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an authority independent of a person's qualities but the ruling 
function conferred on him by the society. 
In all, the good of the society and that of the individual is 
basic to the appointment. Authority in this context presupposes 
some responsibility on the part of the ruler and the ruled. 
2. P O L I T I C A L A U T H O R I T Y 
The presence of authority in our civil society is not disputed 
since experience shows that men obey other men. The definition 
of authority given by Simon, that authority is «an active power 
resident in a person*, shows the impersonality of authority and its 
necessity to be executed by some one or a group. It will be a' 
wasted venture to deny the existence of authority in the society, 
rather than deny it, the problem of the residence of authority ion 
a person or community and how it comes to be vested on or ac-
quired by one or a group should concern us most. This concern 
as mentioned will be approached in two ways: who possesses 
authority and how it comes to reside in a person or a group of 
persons. 
3. W H O POSSESSES A U T H O R I T Y ? 
The problem of the origin and possessor of authority in the 
civil community has plagued the minds of people many centuries 
gone by. The attempt and clarification of this problem is vivid in 
the writings of our eminent authors like Cajetan, Robert Bellar-
mine, Suarez and St. Thomas Aquinas. Our quest for the answers 
to the problems we intend to tackle will begin with our brief ex-
amination of the works of these authors. 
C A J E T A N : The ideas of Cajetan are found in two 
opuscula. 5 In the first of these works, he made a comparison 
between the authority of the Pope and that of the Council. This 
was occasioned by the schismatic Council of Pisa, directed against 
Pope Julius II. The second Opuscula was a defense made in com-
parison between the authority of the Pope and that of the 
Council. 
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The problem of the Papal supremacy and the deposition of 
a heretical Pope lead Cajetan to establish the distinction between 
the civil authority and the papal authority as regards their origin, 
mode of possession, and deposition. In the attempt, he indicated 
the difference by positing that civil power is primarily resident in 
the community and not in a king, whose power is distinct from 
the papal power. He writes: «the foundation for such a difference 
between king and the pope is that the royal power, by natural 
law, resides primarily in the people, and from the people is 
transferred to the king; but the papal power is above nature, and 
by divine law resides in one person; it does not reside, first in a 
community*. 6 What attracts here besides others is that Cajetan 
in the attempt to establish the papal supremacy over the civil 
authority upheld the sovereignty of the people and stressed the 
mode of reception of the king's power-by transfer. In other 
words, the power to depose a man with civil authority is intrinsic 
in the nature of transmission. The Pope stands no chance of 
deposition by the people since his is not a transmited authority 
but subject to another mode of deposition. From Cajetan it is 
gathered that the people only «designated» the person of the Pope 
and therefore in the mind of Simon, what is caused by man is the 
«union of a person with a power which is not, itself, caused by 
man in any sense whatsoever*.7 From this therefore, the power 
exercised in the deposition of the heretical Pope does not imply 
that the Pope acknowledges any superior in this world; the power 
which deposes the heretical Pope is not concerned with the papal 
power which is directly from Christ. It is concerned merely with 
the «union» existing between the papal power and a man-
designated person. 
S T . R O B E R T B E L L A R M I N E : Following after Cajetan, Bellar-
mine wrote in his «Discussion on the Members of the Church* 
that authority is from God and primarily resident in the com-
munity. He was trying to answer the question on christian par-
ticipation in politics, i. e., holding political offices. This was a 
refutation made against holding offices by the Anabaptists and 
Trinitarians of the time. He therefore defended that political 
power is necessary and that its honesty is sanctioned by Holy 
Scripture. He writes: «firstly, the political power considered in its 
universal essence, without going down to the peculiarities of 
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monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, proceeds immediately from 
God alone, for it follows necessarily upon the nature of man; 
consequently it proceeds for the one who made man's nature... 
Secondly that this power has for its immediate subject the whole 
multitude. Indeed, this power is of divine right; but divine right 
did not give it to any particular man; therefore, it gave it to the 
multitude..*.8 The writings of Bellarmine will be of immense im-
portance to this work in the next section when we shall consider 
the transfer of authority. But from my own point of view, the 
work of Bellarmine like that of his predecessor, Cajetan, also 
upheld the sovereignty of the people since in the same venture he 
spoke that the power of the multitude can be transferred to one 
or several by the same law of nature. So far, we are concerned 
with the establishment of the primary possessor of authority and 
the issue of transfer of authority comes later. 
SUAREZ: Discussion is presented as a vindication of Bellar-
mine's theory against the criticism of King James. King James bit-
terly blamed Bellarmine for having asserted that authority is not 
granted by God to the kings as immediately as it is to the Popes. 
He holds that the king receives his power not from the people 
but immediately from God. Suarez in his work tries to explain 
what is meant when it is said that a certain power is immediately 
from God or that God is the immediate cause and author of cer-
tain power. He writes: «power is said to be immediately given by 
God, in unqualified fashion, when God alone acting through his 
will is the proximate and essential cause that gives power...». 9 
He goes on to explain the two ways in which God can give 
a certain power immediately; (a) The power that he gives enter-
tains a natural and necessary connection with the nature of a cer-
tain thing of which he is the author. For example, is the soul 
which he gives immediately intellect and the will, though these 
powers proceed from the soul's substance, (b) The power given by 
God is not necessarily connected with the creation of a thing, but 
it is voluntarily superadded by God to nature or to a person. For 
example, the power of performing miracles. Another example is 
the power given to Peter; God conferred it immediately, directly, 
and per se. 
At this juncture he sets forth to explain the issue of tem-
poral authority of kings; whether it is immediately like that of 
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Peter. Suarez in his proposit ions and distinctions, showed how 
political authority is immediately from G o d and how nevertheless, 
it is intrusted to kings and to senates not immediately by G o d 
but by man. H e writes; «primarily the supreme civil power, con-
sidered in itself, is given immediately by G o d to men assembled 
into a city or perfect political community ; this does not take 
place by a peculiar and, as it were, positive disposition or by a 
donation entirely distinct from the production of such a nature; 
it takes place by way of a natural consequence from the first crea-
tion of such a nature; therefore, as a result of such donation this 
power is not placed in one person or in any peculiar group but 
in the whole complete people or in the b o d y of the com-
munity* . 1 0 
Suarez emphasizes that political authority resides primarily 
not in any particular person or group of persons but in the com-
munity as a whole by demonstrat ing the naturalness of this 
power. H e writes: «by the nature of things, this power resides on-
ly in the community , inasmuch as it is necessary to the preserva-
tion of the latter and inasmuch as it can be manifested by the 
judgment of the natural reason. But all that the natural reason 
shows is that this power is necessary in the community as a 
whole; it does not show that this is necessary in one person or 
in a senate: Therefore, in so far as it is from G o d immediately, 
it is merely understood to be in the community as a whole, not 
in any particular part of it... T h e natural reason cannot conceive 
of any cause by which political power would be determinately 
placed in one person, or in a definite group of persons within the 
community , rather than in another person or group of persons; 
therefore, in so far as it is procured by nature, political power 
does not reside immediately in any subject except the community 
itself*. 1 1 
We observe according to S imon that natural reason does not 
decide, either, that the political regime should be monarchy or 
aristocracy. However , S imon tries to establish from the text of 
S u a r e z the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y , m o n a r c h y and 
aristocracy. Besides democracy, the rest he opined cannot be 
established wi thout a pos i t ive d i spos i t ion, whether divine or 
human therefore affirming the existence «by nature* of democracy 
as opposed to the rest. F r o m Suarez we read; «but democracy can 
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM... 131 
exist without any positive disposition, as a result of a merely 
natural establishment or process, without any addition being re-
quired except the negation of a new or positive disposition, for 
the natural reason states that the supreme political power follows 
upon a perfect communi ty and that, by virtue of this same 
reason, it belongs to the whole communi ty unless it is transferred 
by a new di spos i t ion* . 1 2 
The work of Suarez lays emphasis that natural law gives 
political power to the community but does not demand that this 
power should always remain in the community or be directly ex-
ercised by it. It remains in the communi ty so long as the com-
munity has not decided otherwise or until a change is lawfully 
brought about by one having power. H e writes: «thus the perfect 
community is free by law of nature and it is not subjected to any 
man external to itself: Considered as a whole, it has power over 
itself, and, if no change takes place, this power will be democracy; 
yet, either through the will of the community itself or through 
the action of one having power or a just title, political power can 
be taken away f rom it and transferred to s o m e per son or 
senate» . 1 3 
Suarez like his predecessors extended his proposit ions to em-
brace the theory of t ransmiss ion of authority . H o w e v e r , we 
discover that on the whole all the authors except T h o m a s (not 
treated in this field) had a unified expression of power resident on 
the people - the political community . It can be drawn without 
any equivocation that kings are made by men, by a free transmis-
sion of power to them. T h e establishment that power resides in 
the people is basic in political theory especially when it comes to 
the question of peoples right to installation and change of leader-
ship in a political community . 
4. A C Q U I S I T I O N O F P O L I T I C A L A U T H O R I T Y 
The second problem to be treated is: how does authority come 
to reside in a person or a group of persons? M a n y authorities hold 
that authority in political society is acquired by transmission of 
power by the people to a person or to a group of persons. This 
theory of transmission S imon holds, is attributed to St. T h o m a s 
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as the architect. This was implied in his treatment of the question 
whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws. 
S imon indicated that the answer given by T h o m a s was command-
ed by the principle of proport ion between end and cause. Since 
the end is the c o m m o n good, the efficient cause ought to be pro-
portionately the multitude or a person «holding the part of» , «ac-
ting instead of». «being in charge of», the multitude. T h o m a s 
writes: «now to order anything to the c o m m o n good belongs 
either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care 
of the whole p e o p l e » . 1 4 S i m o n also observed that in another 
question of the same treatise, T h o m a s showed that custom can ob-
tain the force of law; an objection to this statement is derived 
from the public character of the lawmaker. T h o m a s writes: «the 
people among w h o m a custom is introduced may be of two con-
ditions. F o r if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the 
consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far 
more in favor of a particular observance than does the authority 
of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as 
representing the people. Therefore, although each individual can-
not make laws, yet the whole people can. If, however, the people 
have not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish 
a law made by a higher authority, nevertheless, among such a 
people a prevailing custom obtains the force of law insofar as it 
is tolerated by those to w h o m it belongs to make laws for the 
people; because, by the very fact that they tolerate it, they seem 
to approve of that which is introduced by c u s t o m » . 1 5 
Simon noted that the transmission theory is in full agree-
ment with the notion of political authority expressed by Thomas . 
F r o m the text, S imon gave the interpretation that the w o r k im-
plied that power belongs primarily to the people, who can use it 
to make laws for themselves, and that if and when power lies in 
the hands of a distinct person, this person has the character of 
«one who substitutes for the peop le» . 1 6 Therefore it is taken that 
Thomas expressions on the subject of the origin of political power 
supported the transmission theory. 
We have earlier demonstrated that the first bearer of civil 
authority is not the king or any governor but the people as a 
whole - the civil multitude. Whenever there is a distinct governing 
personnel, the multitude have done two things, (a) «they have 
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designated the ruling person and (b) they have transmitted to him 
the authority given by G o d to the p e o p l e » . 1 7 Th i s theory of 
transmission is unmistakeably expressed by Bellarmine who not 
only propounded that power is resident in the community but 
also that this power needs to be transferred to a person for a bet-
ter government of the society. Bellarmine writes: «notice that this 
power is transferred from the multitude to one or several by the 
same law of nature. Since the republic cannot exercise this power 
for herself, it is bound to transfer it to one person, or to a few. 
Thus the power of the princes, considered in its genus, is also of 
natural and divine right, and the human genus could not, even if 
all men were gathered, make a decree to the contrary, viz, decree 
that there be no princes or governor s * . 1 8 
However this w o r k of Bellarmine obviously demonstrates 
that the community would not, in any way have the right to re-
tain and to exercise for itself the authority which resides primarily 
in it. This theory according to S imon rules out direct democracy. 
It therefore implies a necessity imposed o n the society and 
thereby ruling out voluntarity. It is not a matter of free choice 
of the multitude, for according to Bellarmine, «the republic can-
not exercise such power for itself*. This in m y opinion is an 
under estimation of «community management of political power * 
in terms of c o m m o n good by Bellarmine. H e was not aware that 
the community may use in place of distinct governing personnels, 
managers w h o are not really men in authority. S imon expressed 
that transmiss ion of authority is not necessary under all cir-
cumstances rather what is important is authentic transmission of 
authority. H e writes: «there are circumstances under which a com-
munity can do without distinct governing personnel , but the 
thing which is never ethical and never political is insincere, inge-
nuine, unfaithful, apparent, and not real-in short , treacherous-
transmission of author i ty * . 1 9 
T h e transmission theory propounded by our early thinkers 
according to S imon were not meant for democracy alone rather 
they had in view the monarchical government of their time and 
against the claims of emerging absolutism. They meant to define 
general cond i t ion of pol i t ica l sovere ignty ho ld ing for every 
political government. T h e theory is not understood by its pro-
ponents to be distinctly democratic, it is distinctly «political». 
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S imon tries to marshal l out the impl icat ions of its polit ical 
character: (a) it concerns the state, i.e., the complete or perfect 
temporal community , (b) it concerns the fully legitimate govern-
ment of such community rather than what we call a de facto 
government, which must be obeyed to avoid more inconveniences 
greater than disobedience, (c) it concerns a government with a 
degree of autonomy and legally defined powers of resistance in 
the hands of the governed. T h e realization in temporal govern-
ment of these characteristics, makes the transmission theory possi-
ble regardless of the form of government-democratic, aristocratic 
or monarchy. 
By transmission the governed consent to the government 
which is theirs , but it does not imply that this consent is 
necessarily exercised in the democratic procedure of elections. 
Transmission implies that the power which primarily belongs to 
the people and has been transmitted by it to a distinct governing 
personnel can be withdrawn from unworthy rulers. S imon writes: 
«thus whether the regime is democratic or not, the transmission 
theory holds that the people, after having transmitted power ans 
having placed itself in a posit ion of mandatory obedience, retains 
a power greater than the power transmitted; this power is to be 
exercised when, and only when, the governing personnel are 
gravely unfaithful to their t a s k » . 2 0 This according to Cajetan con-
sistitutes the exercise of power greater than that of the king. It 
means that after transmission has been effected, a power greater 
than that of the governing personnel is still possessed by the 
people. 
We need to make a distinction between the transmission of 
power in a democractic society and in a non democratic society. 
The distinction lies in the exercise of this «reminant» power in 
the people after transmission has been effected. 
In a non-democratic society, if the regime is political in the 
full sense of the term, the people remains capable of exercising a 
power superior to that of the king; but the act of transmission 
that such power can be only exercised only under extraordinary 
circumstances and on account of a dire threat to the welfare of 
the community . T h e significance is that in aristocracy and monar-
chy, this power cannot be exercised lawfully except in extreme 
cases. That the people have the power to depose a king after 
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transmission has been effected, presents a doubt on the genuiness 
of the transmission of power. The question remains: if while the 
king is in power, another power superior to his - the power of 
the people, steps in and puts an end to the power of the king, 
do we not say that the king is like the secretary or manager hired 
by the people and therefore the transmission a mere caricature? 
We stated earlier that the transmission theory offers the peo-
ple the opportunity to retain power after transmission has ta-
ken place, yet, transmission holds the people bound to manda-
tory obedience to a government of their consent. This power is 
to be exercised when, and only when there is dire necessity. The 
c o m m o n right of deposition which the transmission theory grants 
to every political organized people, cannot be lawfully exercised 
without extraordinary c ircumstances , wi thout dire immediate 
threat to the c o m m o n good. Under normal circumstances, the 
transmiss ion of power precludes the exercise of this popular 
power which is greater than the power of the king. But for 
Simon in order for the transmission of power to be genuine, it 
suffices that the superior power of the people should be suspended 
by the act of transmission and should remain suspended until cir-
cumstances of extreme seriousness give back to the people the 
right to exercise it. H e writes: «but the act of genuine transmis-
sion suspends the exercise of the people's power. Subjection to the 
king is genuine; subjects are bound in conscience to obey the ge-
nuine power of the k i n g » . 2 1 The proper effect of the extraor-
dinary circumstances under which the people can depose the king 
is to make it lawful for the people to exercise a power which it 
never ceased to have but which could not be lawfully exercised 
under normal circumstances. S imon gave a key to the whole inter-
pretation that: «actual possession of power does not necessarily en-
tail the right to use it actually and that the suspension of the 
right to use a certain power does not necessarily entail the loss 
of this p o w e r » . 2 2 
We have to note that the genuiness of transmission binds 
the superior power of the people, ties it up in such a way that 
only extraordinary circumstances alone can untie it. A n extraor-
dinary power invested on a governor to be used in extreme 
emergency cannot be used lawfully outside emergency situations, 
so also the people who transmited power to a king would be guil-
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ty of criminal disobedience if they decided to depose the king for 
no extraordinary grave reasons. 
This is not a democratic control which is periodically exer-
cised without there being anything abnormal or extraordinary 
about the circumstance. In a democratic regime, after the transmis-
sion of sovereignty which is normal in a non democratic regime, 
the people retains the exercise of powers transmissible in normal 
circumstances. That means according to S imon: «democracy never 
transmits the whole of the power transmissible powers . Every 
democracy remains, in varying degree, a direct democracy * . 2 3 It 
all means that if government by distinct personnel is made 
democratic by control of the people over the governing personnel 
through the procedure of periodic election, the very definition of 
democracy points to merely partial transmission of sovereignty. It 
cannot be said that sovereignty is entirely transmitted to distinct 
personnel when the basic understanding is that this personnel will 
render accounts at the end of a de termined per iod and be 
reinstated or not by the act of the people's sovereignty. But in ad-
dition to the basic procedure of control over the governing per-
sonnel through periodic elections, democratic practice always re-
tains some aspects of direct democratic government. O n e of these 
practices is the obligation of submitting some important laws to 
referendum and another without which the modern democracy is 
inconcievable, is the power of public opinion. 
By way of conclus ion, it can be said that transmiss ion 
theory is very much accepted in democracy in that the sovereign-
ty of the people is not lost. T h e people owe obedience to a 
government that is theirs and have a full right of control over the 
governing personnel. This of course does not mean that those in 
authority are puppet kings, the use of well framed constitution 
checks any arbitrariness of the use of power and gurantees rights 
and respects to both the ruler and the ruled. 
5. T H E F U N C T I O N S O F A U T H O R I T Y 
The need for authority in the society agitated the minds of 
many people especially the liberalists. Democracy for some people 
should play down the issue or if possible scrape authority from 
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the society. This tendency is a result of the misconceptions of 
authority especially the inability to differenciate authority from its 
instruments of operations as we stated earlier. S imon believes that 
a deep understanding of the functions of authority will go a long 
way to disabuse our minds the false conceptions of authority and 
at the same t ime establish the authentici ty and necessity of 
authority in the society. 
In the treatment of the functions of authority, we shall 
discover that S imon in a narrowed sense identified two types of 
functions; the paternal function and the essential function of 
authority. Under the paternal function, the substitutional, and 
pedagogical functions of authority are discussed. Therefore taking 
it in a wider sense, authority exercises: paternal, substitutional, 
pedagogical, and essential functions. 
Authority is paternal when it aims at the proper good of 
the governed. This is made manifest in the governance of children 
and the young ones who should be trained in self government. 
But there is a necessity to have mature intellects, stronger wills, 
and wider experienced persons to govern the younger minds for 
their suvival. In formulating the function of authority here which 
is paternal, the aim of authority is the proper good of the govern-
ed. A child needs direction because he is not able to take care of 
himself, i.e., to direct himself toward his own preservation and 
perfection. It can be said that authority is needed for the survival 
and development of the immature person. 
Expanding the need for paternal authority here, it will be 
seen that authority is made necessary by a «deficiency», i.e., 
parents take care of the child «in as much as and in so far as the 
child is unable to take care of himsel f» . 2 4 . T h e father substitutes 
his mature judgment and will for the judgment and will of the 
child, which are still immature. The paternal function of authority 
is not essential but «substitutional». 
A n e l abora t ion of this concept «def ic iency» a d m i t s of 
degrees. Deficiency always signifies the lack of a perfection that a 
subject should possess in order to satisfy fully the demands of its 
nature. Yet, a deficiency is not necessarily an evil since a nature 
suject to growth normally goes through a period of inachievement 
according to Aristotle. 2 5 We find that a child is an incompletely 
developed person and there is nothing wrong about a child's hav-
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ing only a child's power, but there is something wrong about an 
adult person whose mental age is seven. Thus , among the deficien-
cies that m a k e paternal au thor i ty necessary , s o m e have the 
character of evil, and some do not. Some are normal , and some 
are not. According to S imon; «there would be no r o o m for pater-
nal authority in a society free from deficiencies, but there would 
be plenty of r o o m for it in a human society free from evil, since 
the members of human societies are bound to be children before 
they are m e n * . 2 6 
Authori ty as paternal, exercises another function-pedagogical, 
which aims at its own disappearance as a consequence of its 
substitutional character, that is to say, authority is pedagogical 
when the purpose of th guidance consists in the attainment of the 
ability to exercise self-government. T h e main purpose of this 
guidance is to attain «matur i ty» and should disappear at the 
earliest possible achievement of this purpose. Failure to disappear 
according to S imon «would be tantamount to a gross abuse» . 2 7 
Paternal authority remaining necessarily past the earliest possible 
date of its own disappearance and thereby intending its own 
maintenance and managment of things in such a way as not to 
have to disappear, has failed to a degree. 
Authori ty as engaged in this substitutional and pedagogical 
fuction we call «paternal». besides the father-to-son relationship, 
have its paternal role felt in other situations. S imon observed that 
the proper good with which paternal authority is concerned is not 
necessari ly individual . T h e c o m m o n g o o d of a city has the 
character of a proper good for any unit in which the city is con-
tained and for other cities as well. F o r S imon, «just as an in-
dividual may need to be directed in the pursuit of his individual 
good, so a community may be unable to attain its own c o m m o n 
good without gu idance * . 2 8 The inability of a city to discharge 
her welfare normally and satisfactorily may necessitate the state to 
take over the administration of the city on account of this in-
capacity. Here , the authority so exercised by the state is of the 
paternal type. It is taken that the state is not concerned at least 
directly with her own good, but with the proper good of the ci-
ty. It is substitutional according to S imon «since it does things 
that the governed should be able to do for themselves and it aims 
at its own disappearance or becomes abus ive * . 2 9 
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As in the case of the individual, the deficiencies calling for 
the exercise of paternal authority over the communit ies may 
either be abnormal and have the character of evil or consists in 
conditions of immaturity normal for societies as well as for in-
dividuals during early phases of growth. It will be of great help 
to expose here some abuses which dominated the age of col-
onialism thereby creating mix-feelings about authority and opened 
the door wide for attack on authority. 
The status of territory, as opposed to statehood, is the legal 
expression for a condition of immaturity, of incomplete develop-
ment on account of which a community is supposed not to be 
able to exercise all the prerogatives of self government and conse-
quently remains with regard to its own affairs, subject to guidance 
by a more perfect community , viz, the union. This legal concept 
of «territory» according to S imon does not « imply any perjorative 
connotation, the status of territory is a condition of m i n o r i t y * . 3 0 
But S imon observed that certain conditions can make the subjec-
tion to paternal authority wrong; either the subordinate society in 
a way fails to accomplish normal development or the controlling 
society through abuse maintains power. The latter is manifested in 
the early history of colonization. The subjection to colonial rule 
was rendered suspicious from the beginning by the fact that the 
colonizing states were not prior to establishment of power by 
conquest , contained in nations colonized. In fact there is no 
ground for the paternal authority of one community over another 
unless the latter is contained in the former as a child in his fami-
ly. F o r S imon, the exonoration of the colonizers, if at all, would 
have been based on thier actions «as agents of the human com-
munity, then entirely organ ized* . 3 1 The attempt at the organiza-
tion of human community as the «League of N a t i o n s * and the 
«United Nat ions * , in a way makes paternal authority a bit clearer. 
The character of colonial rule as paternal authority was proclaim-
ed and to some extent sanctioned. T h e words , mandate , and 
trusteeship, were substitutes for the word colony and used to 
justify the rule over primitive peoples which resided in duties of 
paternal authority to be discharged by mankind toward immature 
societies. 
Mention should be made also about the abuses of colonial 
rule exercised by an upper class over the lower ones. It was 
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assumed that among the lower class in the community , their hap-
piness depends upon helful guidance by the «master-race». T h e so 
called «inferior» race is considered as a distinct society, contained 
in the bigger unit of which the upper race is the main part but 
not merged with the inferior race into a intergrated community . 
However the domain of paternal authority is expansive, as we 
earlier expla ined ( i m m a t u r e c o m m u n i t i e s inclus ive) , but the 
authority of the elite leaders over a community considered per-
manently incapable of autonomy serves as an ideal but has none 
of d e m o c r a t i c c h a r a c t e r . S i m o n o b s e r v e s ; « g rea t h i s to r i ca l 
movements were dominated by the conviction that most men are 
permanently incapable of autonomy and that the best that can be 
done for them is to turn out, from within the world of the 
distinguished few, an elite of leaders trained and educated by men 
of rare knowledge and superior virtue. There is nothing particular-
ly mysterious or perverse about such an ideal, but it is not a 
democratic o n e » . 3 2 
What is therefore the democratic stand on paternal authori-
ty? It has been said that the function of paternal authority is 
animated with a desire for a u t o n o m y of the governed. T h e 
substitutional character entails its being pedagogical , so as to 
necessitate its own disappearance at the earliest achievement of its 
goal. F o r S imon it is impossible to posite the principle of paternal 
authority without posit ing s imultaneously a principle of auto-
nomy. H e observes; «with regard to the proper good eithier of 
the individual or of the group, the possibility of self-government 
makes it obligatory for authority to disappear; and the possibility 
of p r o g r e s s t o w a r d se l f -government m a k e s it o b l i g a t o r y for 
authority to follow the ways of such progres s» . 3 3 Therefore un-
due postponement of self-rule in the mind of S imon «can never 
find an excuse in the principle of paternal authority, which con-
tains a demand for the production of a u t o n o m y * . 3 4 
In so far as the government exercises paternal authority, it 
is plainly true the ideally successful government is that which 
governs least and can afford to disappear. This proposit ion certain-
ly holds for the paternal function of authority, both in civil 
government and in any kind of government. 
The dynamism of autonomy, contained in the essence of 
paternal authority, is very congenial to democratic mind according 
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to S imon. However he observed that this does not by any means 
pertain to the distinctive features of democratic government but 
on ly true to c o m m o n features of just g o v e r n m e n t , whether 
democratic or not. A democratic rule that proceeds according to 
justice would not exercise any paternal authority without also 
practicing through dedication to the production of autonomy. The 
distinct stand of democracy with regard to paternal authority con-
cerns primarily according to S imon, «with the relation between 
' the few' and ' the m a n y ' » . 3 5 T h e few and the m a n y here 
understood in the writings of Alexander H a m i l t o n is a class 
distinction between the rich and the poor . The few for Alexander 
are men of proper ty , of education, of quiet judgment ; their 
economic position, together with their experience and knowledge, 
enables them to resist the whims of the moment and to conceive 
and perseveringly to carry our long-range policies. 3 6 
According to S imon: «any theory which maintains that the 
many need to be governed by the few in paternalistic and quasi-
colonial fashion is undemocra t i c * . 3 7 We can not deny the cir-
cumstances where a quasi-colonial government of many by the 
few may be the best government or even the only conceivable 
one. As such, the circumstances do not make the practice of 
democratic government in any way possible. But S imon on the 
other hand makes it clear that a calculated dominion of the many 
by a few specially identified as the «worthy» due to their privileg-
ed position in the society, is undemocratic. According to him, 
«the theory that paternal rule of the few over the m a n y is 
necessary and always a desirable state of affairs is in plain conflict 
with democratic doc t r ine * . 3 8 
T h e r e are s o m e w h o bel ieve that the ab i l i ty t o self-
government, needs to be tested before the disappearance of pater-
nal authority to avoid disorder and revolt rather than autonomy. 
What they truely forget is that the democratic spirit is characteriz-
ed by a certain sort of audacity. This fact is uncongenial to con-
servative spirit. Democracy demands so far as the c o m m o n man 
is concerned certain risks to be accepted. This in a long way 
favors early granting of au tonomy in all domains of paternal 
authority and the end in our time of all colonial rule, regardless, 
as it were, of the risks. M a n y conservatives, considering that the 
end of the quasi-colonial rule of the few over the many opened 
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an era of uncertainty feeling conf irmed in their paternalist ic 
phi losophy. But the general evolution of modern societies today 
suggests the falsity of the above named claims. Whenever there 
are fair evidences that self-government is possible, paternalistic rule 
is actually forced to go. The operation is known to be r isky but 
according to S imon, «the modern societies seem to be necessitated 
by the weight .o f their history to accept the risk, and under such 
circumstances, the promise of an easy life is but seduction into 
decadence* . 3 9 
In the preceeding exposition of authority, we emphasized 
the substitutional character of paternal authority. N o w it is for us 
to establish if authority has essential functions to play. S imon not 
only identified the paternal functions of authority in its ramifica-
tions but also harped on the essential functions of authority. 
S imon writes : «granted that in m a n y cases author i ty merely 
substitutes for self-government, the theory that it also has essential 
function must be tested first in the field of community l i fe» . 4 0 
H e maintains that the existence of plurality of genuine means in 
the pursuit of the c o m m o n good excludes unanimity as a suffi-
cient method of steadily procuring unity of action. 
T o achieve indispensible unity of c o m m o n action, S imon 
observed that only one method is s imply left and that is, «accep-
tance of and following as rule of action one judgment constituted 
into rule for a l l » . 4 1 The c o m m o n rule might be at variance with 
m y liking and I would be equally bound to follow it out of 
dedication to the c o m m o n good which cannot be attained except 
through united action. Thus for S imon «to submit myself to a 
judgment which does not, or at least may not express m y own 
view of what should be done is to obey author i ty» . 4 2 Uni ty of 
action depends on the unity of judgment, and unity of judgment 
can be procured either by way of authority or uninanimity. So 
far there is no third possibility conceivable in making a judgment, 
no matter how diverse our preferences, we shall all assent to one 
judgment and follow the line action that it prescribes. The com-
mon action of rational beings implies their c o m m o n adherence to 
a c o m m o n rule of action, to a practical judgment which has to 
be one, if there is to be any c o m m o n action at all. The figure 
that utters the judgment is of little difference. S imon in his view 
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maintained that: «the power in charge of unifying c o m m o n action 
through rules binding for all is what every one calls authori-
t y ^ 4 3 . 
Let me at this point play down on repetition by stating the 
areas according to S imon that makes authority essential in the 
society: 
(a). That every community is relative to a good to be sought 
and enjoyed in common. But by the fact that the community 
comprises individuals, the unity of action must be sought and can-
not be taken for granted, (b). That rational agents are guided by 
judgment, and therefore the problem of bringing about unity in 
the action of men resolves into the problem of insuring the unity 
of their practical judgment, (c). That a deliberating assembly is a 
community designed to stand disagreement, yet in order that it 
should exist at all, there must be some agreement regarding some 
principles and in this case unity of judgment cannot be procured 
by rational communication, (d). That united action demands a 
principle that works steadily amidst the overwhelming contingen-
cies of perishable existience, and (e). that even among virtuous 
people, there exists the problem of unifying or coming to terms 
with an act among varieties of virtuous actions at the disposal of 
the community . 
In all S imon tried to establish that authority as a cause of 
united action exercises essential function, i.e., a function «made 
necessary not by any evil or deficiency but by the nature of com-
mon ac t ion» . 4 4 H e continues: «given a community on its way to 
its c o m m o n good, and given, on the part of this community , the 
degree of excellence which entails the possibility of attaining the 
good in a diversity of ways , authority has an indispensible role to 
play and this role originates entirely in plenitude and accomplish-
m e n t * . 4 5 It can therefore be established here that the c o m m o n 
good demands that problem of united action which cannot be 
solved by way of unanimity should be solved by way of authori-
ty. This according to S imon is the essential function of authority, 
i.e., «to assure the unity of action af a plurality of men in the 
pursuit of their c o m m o n g o o d » . 4 6 In matters relevant to concrete 
practice, S imon observed that the achievment of unity is uncertain 
by unanimous consent since unanimity is not only precarious, it 
is also casual. 
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N o w considering the function of authority as an indispensi-
ble principle of united action when there are several means to the 
c o m m o n good, we are left to examine if this essentiality is due 
to deficiency or by the good nature of things. This question 
awoke in the early 19th century due to a rationalistic enthusaism 
inherent in the belief that the social sciences would solve the pro-
blem of indétermination of the appropriate means which paved 
the way for the necessity of authority. O u r inability to determine 
the appropriate means to an end is due to lack of adequate infor-
mation. In other words , our ignorance opens a phase of indéter-
mination that authority, in blind fashion, closes. Better knowledge 
would eliminate the phase of indétermination and its unenlighten-
ed ending. 
S imon tried to explain the essential need for authority in a 
highly enlightened society by positing the principle I may say of 
more increase in choice in an enlightened society than in an ig-
norant society and that plurality of genuine means can also be 
caused by excellence of knowledge and power. 
F o r S imon knowledge would rule out illusory means, but «it 
would need authority more than ever to procure united action, 
for thanks to better lights, the plurality of the genuine means 
would have increased cons iderably* . 4 7 T h e function of authority, 
i.e., that of procuring united action according to S imon does not 
disappear but grows as deficiencies are made up ; «it originates not 
in the defects of men and societies but in the nature of the socie-
t y * . 4 8 This in a way is in consonant with the mind of Taparelli 
d 'Azeglio, who conceives the society as made up of intelligent be-
ings w h o despite their intelligence need authority for the sake of 
a united society. H e writes: «the society consists in a union of in-
telligent beings which tend toward a c o m m o n end being en-
dowed with intellect and free-will, the members of a society must 
tend by several means toward a c o m m o n end; they can choose 
between those means. Since diverse and opposite means would 
abolish social unity and destroy the essence of society, it is 
necessary to have an intelligent principle regulate the minds and 
impose the same tendencies on all the wills. N o w we call authori-
ty this power which binds all members of society. Thus authority 
is an essential element of soc ie ty * . 4 9 
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Let us by way of conclusion on authority say that the paternal 
function of authority often substitutes the reason and will of a 
human agent who on account of some deficiency, cannot take care 
of his own affairs. The deficiency which call for government by an-
other, may be normal as in a child or by accident of nature, like 
the feeble minded or by the wrong use of one's free will like the 
criminal. In performing this function, the good of the governed is 
upper in the mind of the governor and not necessarily personal. 
But no matter how important it may be, the paternal function 
of authority is never essential, for according to Simon, «what makes 
it necessary is not any feature of essence, but always the absence of 
some per fect ion* . 5 0 Here it only substitutes for a deficient reason 
and will and therefore is provisional and pedagogical in character. 
The c o m m o n good is central to the theory of authority and 
it is in relation to it that authority exercises essential functions, 
i.e., functions not necessitated by evil or deficiency but from the 
nature and the excellence of things-human and social. It is in com-
mon action alone that concrete existence with all its determinateness, 
with its character of totality, its location in time, and its contingen-
cy, tends to procure unity among men. 
Further, it has to be borne in mind that authority as agency 
wholly concerned with the c o m m o n good is connected with the 
excellence of particularity, i.e., in sofar as the particularity involv-
ed is that of the subject, not that of the function, S imon holds 
that the theory of authority comprises a vindication of autonomy 
on all levels. Liberalism and Socialism on their part believe that 
authority is not necessary, it is accidental and should be disengag-
ed from a perfect society. However , since nature has destined man 
to live in a society with a diversity of interests and pursuits which 
make it clear that there are many courses open to men when seek-
ing the end they desire, guidance is necessary both for directing 
men to their purpose and for a peaceful coexistence in the society. 
6. A U T H O R I T Y A N D POLITICAL F R E E D O M 
Simon maintains that the understanding of authority depends 
greatly on a good understanding of its functions. These functions 
namely paternal, substitutional, and pedagogical, more or less disap-
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pear when the subject has acquired its determination, i.e., when 
the cause for the need for authority has disappeared. 
To understand the relation between authority and political 
liberty, one needs to consider the importance of society in which 
man lives and operates. The concept of society implies the ex-
istence and the establishment of relations between man and man. 
Yves Simon sees the society as «an assemblage for the sake of no-
ble life of the members*. 5 1 While for St. Thomas, the society is 
«a stable union of a plurality of persons in pursuit of a common 
goal*. 5 2 From all indications, we cannot speak of society unless 
there are before us several human beings, their lives in some way 
interrelated and interconnected. Fundamentally speaking, man by 
his nature needs to live in a society for security, sociality and for 
proper development of his intellectual and whole personality. 
The temporal end of the society is happiness for man and 
the basic task of civil society in its administrations is to ensure 
the realization of this goal. This happiness is the common good 
and the aim of societal living. Simon observed that necessity 
demands that people lacking the good will or the understanding 
should be directed to it and even «have to be compelled not to 
harm the common good and also serve it positively*. 5 3 
It is to ensure the unity of the common action for the 
achievement of the common good that authority is made essential. 
The common good is used principally in the political order. The 
political common good is not only a good which is possessed but 
is actually shared by many. It is the only good which as an object 
of love elicits a concordance of many wills and as an object of 
desire, requires the concrete activity of many persons. Authority 
is essentially necessary to ensure the unity of action of a united 
multitude. A multitude aiming at a common good which can be 
attained through common action must be united in action accor-
ding to Simon «only by some principle and this principle is 
precisely what we call authori ty* . 5 4 This indicates that the 
realization of the common good presupposes the presence of 
authority to ensure a common action. 
The state is a multitude politically organized and the many 
precisely as members of the political community participate in the 
goodness or well being of the community they constitute through 
association with one another and so individual good must be 
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ordered towards the c o m m o n good for the realization of a stable 
society. This participation must be free and each individual has 
the freedom to participate in terms of equality with one another 
in determinig the character of government institutions directly or 
indirectly. A n individual as a subject is politically free in so far 
as his individual will is in accord with the «collective» will ex-
pressed in social order and such harmony of the collective and in-
dividual will is guranteed only if the social order is created by the 
individuals whose behavour it regulates. This collective will is on-
ly achieved through a principle which Simon identifies before as 
«authority». 
The relation between authority and freedom as stated earlier 
has always been misconcieved due to a bad conception of authori-
ty. It is always associated with force, absolutism and exploitation 
by liberalists, but S imon earlier observed that «our social hap-
piness is based upon a felicitous combination of authority and 
l iber ty * . 5 5 Authori ty and freedom according to S imon «are an-
tinomies in the sense that they are opposed to each other, and 
complementary in the sense that when authority is not balanced 
by liberty it becomes tyranny and when liberty is not fairly 
balanced by authority, it becomes abusive l i sense». 5 6 
Simon believed that the attack on authority is based on a 
poor notion of the c o m m o n good. C o m m o n good he said «is an 
end of such a nature that it has to be intended in c o m m o n and 
achieved through c o m m o n ac t ion * 5 7 . H e continues: «whoever op-
poses some principles required for c o m m o n action is bound to 
brush aside the very notion of c o m m o n g o o d » . 5 8 N o w a liberty 
that revolts against the c o m m o n good has most decidedly fallen 
away from its adherence to the end which is the primary condi-
tion of its perfection. The individualistic revolt against the re-
quirements of the c o m m o n good according to S imon, «turns to a 
state of lonesomeness, indicision, that withness the tr iumph of 
disintergration with the person himself and ends logically in a 
state of d i spa ir» . 5 9 
We exper ience another sharp confl ict be tween the re-
quirements of freedom and demands of authority whenever that 
which is really evil is proposed as a good to the c o m m o n action 
of a society. There is a misconception, a perversion of the com-
mon good merely if an end which could be achieved satisfactorily 
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through the initiative of the individual, or through that of the 
small social unit is forcebly incorporated into the end to be pur-
sued directly through the action of a large social unit. S imon 
maintains that in such circumstances the principle of authority 
must be regularly supplemented by the principle of autonomy. 
N o w with regard to political freedom, it is the freedom to 
participate on terms of equality with one another in determining 
the character of government institutions, laws, policies, and prac-
tices either directly or indirectly through election of officers and 
representatives authorized to determine their character. Aristotle 
stated that direct participation in the affairs of the state is what 
political freedom means. Participation in the government is a way 
of increasing the number of times the individual can act in accor-
dance with his own desires which still obey the enforceable rules 
of the society. T h e status of citizenship according to Aristotle 
under constitutional government is one of political liberty. This 
presupposes that political freedom does not emancipate those who 
are citizens from the authority of the law which each has a hand 
in the making, though man is free, but his self-freedom according 
to S imon does not mean that he obeys only himself and is subject 
to no authority except his o w n reason, rather it means that «so 
far as the ends of action are concerned, the free man is not sub-
ject to authority, except for his o w n good and for the c o m m o n 
g o o d » . 6 0 
Political freedom is the right of every man but it by no 
means guarantee that he well be bound by only his own will. 
Rather it guarantees that his will is to be counted among the rest 
in making decisions and the community as a whole bound by the 
main current flowing within it. F o r Maritain, «if citizens have an 
additional liberty through suffrage, that does not consist in each 
man obeying himself a lone» . 6 1 Th ink of a society where every 
one expresses his own will without moderation. It is only anarchy 
that will rule and we may not call that a society. S imon main-
tains that authority is essentially needed in society for direction 
and agreement o n a c o m m o n action for a c o m m o n purpose . 
F r e e d o m does no t m e a n lawlessness w h i c h is « u n b o u n d e d » 
freedom. Maritain has this to say: «such being the condition of 
human liberty, it needed protection, it needed help and assistance 
capable of directing all its movements towards the good and diver-
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ting them from evil; otherwise free will would have been a very 
harmful thing to m a n » . 6 2 
It is the substitutional function of authority which brings 
authority and freedom at polarities. But the essential function of 
authority is not at variance with liberty. Insofar as authority deter-
mines the c o m m o n good, its function is essential and does not 
diminish and will not diminish as the community achieves greater 
perfection. O n the contrary, as the society becomes more complex 
and the range of alternative goods expand, authority becomes even 
more necessary than it was in the smaller and more primitive socie-
ty. In this aspect of authority, there is a respect for individual 
autonomy while at the same time the individual must work within 
the collective consciousness of the society. It is only authority that 
can make it possible for all not to step on each others toes. 
Political freedom is individual freedom in relation to the state. 
It does not consist in acting as one wishes in matters not regulated 
by law or even in acting as one wishes in obedience to law which 
prescribes action that the individual himself desires to perform. 
Authori ty is «an active power residing in a person and exercised 
through a c o m m a n d » . 6 3 The happiness of a society depends on 
the consciousness of both the ruler and the ruled of the limits of 
authority to be exercised and extent of obedience and freedom of 
the ruled. Simon writes: «whatever the considered community, small 
or large, familial, economic or political, its happiness depends on 
the ability of its head to determine exactly the right limits of his 
authority, together with the ability of those who must obey to 
recognize that their claim for freedom cannot reasonably exceed cer-
tain l imi t s » . 6 4 So the society enjoy happiness based on a good 
relationship between authority and freedom. Both unrestricted 
freedom and boundless authority are according to Simon «ficticious 
conceptions, each of which implies its own negation together with 
the annihilation of soc ie ty * . 6 5 
We say that there is not, as a matter of fact any opposit ion 
between authority considered in its essential functions and the pro-
gress of freedom. What is needed is a fruitful dialogue and good 
understanding among them. A well combined force of authority 
and freedom ensures a happy society. Even though they are an-
t inomies , yet their complemtary benefits out weigh whatever 
divergencies that exists between them. 
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7. A U T H O R I T Y A N D T R U T H 
The preceding section of this w o r k dealt with the function 
of authority in its practical order. The discharge of this function 
was more or less a substitutional function. Authori ty exercised an 
essential function as stated not necessarily due to deficiencies but 
as a result of the nature of things. In relation to truth, the pro-
blem raised by modern thoughts , especially the liberals, point to 
a doctrine based on a «complete freedom of thought * i.e., freedom 
from any impositions on the mind or any definite ways of think-
ing. The Sceptists, Agnostics , Pragmatists and Positivists deny 
theoretical knowledge of the truth and therefore hold it nonsen-
sical to ta lk a b o u t the ro le of a u t h o r i t y in the sphere of 
theoretical truth. It is therefore necessary to take a look into the 
relation between authority and truth and see if authority has any 
function to play in relation to the knowledge and protection of 
truth. 
The proper subject of truth is the act of judging. It is in the 
making of this judgment that the mind becomes aware of the rela-
tion of conformity between its own interior constructs (enuncia-
tions according to Simon) and the reality of things. Judgment is 
entirely formed «when the mind by perceiving the truth of a pro-
position, i.e., its conformity with the real, assents to this proposi-
t ion* . ('6 Truth is an adeqation, i.e., according to St. T h o m a s , «a 
conformity of a thing and an intel lect* . 6 7 For S imon, truth con-
sists in «conformity to the requirements of sound intent ions * . 6 8 
Simon tried to explain here that a decision made under accepted 
circumstances guarantied by perfect wisdom and honesty, even 
though contingencies may produce failure, is in agreement with 
the right intention and this is «the truth proper to the practical 
j udgment * . 6 9 
Considering that the proper object of judgment is the rela-
tion of truth, whenever assent is totally determined by truth, 
S imon asserts that «the object holds unqualified power of deci-
s i o n * . 7 0 This he accepts as a victory of the object which at the 
same t ime authenticates the perfect ion of knowledge . When 
perfect conditions or the knowledge of truth are preserved, the ut-
tering of the assent is neither a matter of authority nor a matter 
of liberty. T h e object is sovereign and wholly causes the deter-
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mination of the mind. In the presence of any evident object 
therefore, the mind has its assent forced upon itself and does not 
enjoy any kind of liberty, «it is an issue settled by objectivity*. 7 1 
Authority plays no part since according to Simon, authority «can 
only be exercised upon a subject endowed with some kind of 
liberty*. 7 2 If the mind does not give assent in the presence of 
evident objects it means that there is a purposeful withdrawal of 
attention to escape the recognition of a fully enlightened truth. 
Simon writes: «when the mind is confronted by an obvious pro-
position, accompanied by all the conditions of its obviousness, it 
can neither utter an assent contrary to truth nor withold its as-
sent and remain silent. The only thing that can be done by act 
of the will is to remove attention*. 7 3 
In the study of the theoretical function of authority, Simon 
had recourse to the use of authority of witness and teacher who 
stand for facts that are not objectively immediate. Simon tries to 
explain that a witness has no authority and may not give orders 
or demand obedience. The authority of a witness is nothing else 
than truthfulness as expressed by signs which make it recognizable 
in varying degrees of assurance. However, a witness may be a 
leader and as a leader, exercise command. 
It is clear that a lot of events some time considered doubtful 
finally has been established by the authority of witnesses. There 
are certain facts we did not see and have to depend on the 
authority of those who witnessed it. Among the propositions 
communicated from mind to mind, both in daily and in scholarly 
life, only few can be readily verified by the receiver. 
In one way or the order, the authority of a witness remains 
an acceptable fact in that field. Example also is made of scientific 
processes where a lot depends upon the testimony of others. Man 
is limited and every physicist confines his efforts to either the 
theoretical or the experimental field and consents to be a mere 
believer in the field which is not his. 
With regard to historical facts, the need to believe takes on 
a distinct meaning. The history of mankind and the physical 
world have facts that are unique and unrenewable unlike the 
sciences whose facts are indeed renewable, and scientific 
demonstrations and computations admit of being repeated by in-
definitely many people. So the necessity of believing in science is 
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merely factual. But in history, we know that a portion of human 
past which can be attained by physical evidence is little in com-
parison with what can be known only through testimony. It 
becomes a fact that whoever was not present when and where the 
event took place has to choose between complete ignorance or 
dependence upon the authority of witnesses. Authority so 
understood plays a large part in the cognition of theoretical truth. 
From our common knowledge, it is known that a great 
number of truths do not appear under the perfect conditions of 
enlightenment and as such are subject to some procedures in order 
to realize the object of their truths. Under these processes, there 
may be certain interventions which might disrupt in a way the 
possibility of ascertaining the authentic truth. Again we need to 
take into consideration the progressive character of the human 
mind which renders many truths which are intrinsically capable 
of evidence, not perceived as evident by the mind in the first 
phase of its development. Even if care is not taken, their evidence 
might remain permanently hidden beyond the reach of many in-
dividual intellects. An example of a beginner in sciences who may 
not perceive at once the evidence of scientific demonstrations, is 
a good one. Unless a firm assent is given to the truths whose 
evidence is not yet perceived, there is a good chance that their 
evidence will not be percieved at all. Here then the trustwor-
thiness of the teacher is taken into belief provisionally until the 
student is able to see the fact himself. According to Simon this 
aspect is where authority performs a substitutional function, i.e., 
«the authority of the teacher provisionally substitutes for the 
evidence of the object*. 7 4 Simon warns that it is a great abuse 
on the part of the teacher to nurse ambition which makes his 
position permanent. A teacher for Simon «must convince his 
pupils that they never should use his reliability as an excuse to 
spare themselves the hardships of intelligent apprehension*. 7 5 
Authority here should be helpful only for the maturity of the 
students. Equally, I may say, this finality to be attained by the 
student namely maturity should be the purpose of any govern-
ment over immature human beings and communities to attain 
their maturity and autonomy. 
What happens to metaphysics and morals whose truths are 
objectively demonstrable? Agnostic liberalism does not deny that 
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objects can determine in unique and necessary fashion, the assent 
of the human mind, but it holds that this property belongs only 
to observable relations and to the logical principle which govern 
the construction of the sciencies. Thus the universe of knowledge 
is divided into two systems: that of experience and that which do 
not admit of experiental verification - the transcendent. T h e 
t r a n s c e n d e n t s y s t e m c o m p r i s e s all p r o p o s i t i o n s re l a t ive t o 
metaphysical objects, such as the first cause of the world and its 
last end. It is clear that only few minds enjoy the privilege of 
having the most important truths of the natural order disclosed to 
their minds in such a way as to have their minds thoroughly 
determined by these truths. In sciences there are few statements 
that are fully evident to an author so that scientific certitude is 
organized in a complex of other minds. T h e need for authority 
is necessary in matters felt in these fields. 
Authorative protection against the forces of error is salutary 
in every way to protect truth. A n y theoretical error concerning 
these great fields radically corrupts the source from which the 
right knowledge springs. S imon always maintained that «the right 
intention of the end and the dominion over the means are born 
of the knowledge of the t ru th» . 7 6 H e continues «there is nothing 
more profound in the life of the intellect than our eagerness to 
know, without tepidity and without fear, under conditions of cer-
titude totally determined by the power of t ru th» . 7 7 Authoritative 
protection here does not conflict with liberty since «liberty is a 
power which is thoroughly impaired by any failure to intend the 
end proper ly» . 7 8 
Error can occur in the minds of men if not held in check 
by the labor of human reason. T h e society endeavours to provide 
truth with some kind of protection and privilege. S imon writes: 
«If truths capable of evidence need some authoritative protection 
against the powers of error, this holds a fortiori for the great 
number of truths which are not , under ordinary condit ions , 
capable of complete enl ightenment* . 7 9 
T h e essence of liberalism as far as intellectual freedom is 
concerned must be defined according to S imon in relation to the 
sociology of truth. This school of thought deny the society the 
right to take stands on metaphysical issues and on all issues per-
taining to the ultimate vindication of legal and ethical rules. The 
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transcendent system is held to be the domain of private cons-
cience and of the spiritual power, if there be such a thing. 
In summary Simon underlines the basic teaching inherent 
in this school of thought as «an installation of self» and a deem-
phasis on the relation of the individual and the society and the 
attendant responsibility of the society on the growth of the in-
dividual. F o r example: principles which vindicate ultimately the 
prohibition of immoral acts like murder, theft, etc. are the con-
cern of individual consciences. Whether these principles are firm 
or badly jeopardize the code of practical morality without which 
no social life is possible is none of society's busines. According to 
the inclination of your will, you adopt as final vindication of the 
p roh ib i t ion of cr imes and felonies . E v e n if y o u are a pure 
empericist, you may refrain from inquiring into the principles of 
your act ion. Al l these ques t ions perta in t o individual cons-
ciences. 8 0 
But no social life is possible without rules of positive law 
promulgated by society and guarantied by sanctions that no one 
can escape. N o society would be possible without a code of prac-
tical ethics concerning the operations of human life. A l so no 
society is possible in modern times at least without the embodi-
ment in positive law of many scientific and technical conclusions-
e.g., as in the control of foods and drugs, and in the prevention 
of in fec t ious diseases or acc idents . In the m i n d of S i m o n , 
«whoever holds that society must refrain from any act relative to 
transcendent truth, and that the search for such truth must be 
neither directed nor helped in any way by the society is a 
l iberal * . 8 1 
T h e prob lem of the indispensible harmony between the 
beliefs of society and those of its members cannot be solved in 
the case of the state, by the spontaneous operation of intellectual 
affinities, the only way to solve it according to S imon is «to 
reduce the intellectual content of public life to a min imum of pro-
positions so chosen that no normal person can d i sagree* . 8 2 This 
of course cannot be achieved by unanimity but by authority. Let 
us not lose sight of the fact that left alone to self without the 
help of the society, the individual intellect is not likely to find 
the most vitally needed truths. 
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A s a conclus ion, we may say that the intervention of 
authority in theoretical truth is more or less substitutional. It re-
mains essential in certain cases otherwise it should disappear with 
the apprehension of the truth. Authori ty as realized should not 
and must not exercise absolute protection over truth. A n y ob-
solate protection over truth instead of protecting it injures it. The 
place of authority as regards truth is more or less protectional i.e., 
paternal in its function, and above all substitutional. S imon writes: 
«the simple consideration that the role of authority in theoretical 
matters is entirely substitutional, makes it easy to understand both 
how docility to reliable witness proceeds from the love of truth, 
and how the love of truth stirs an indefatigable eagerness for a 
cognition in which authority no longer plays any p a r t » . 8 3 
C O N C L U S I O N 
A s we come to the end of this work , certain salient points 
about the thought of S imon are to be recapitulated. 
Authority and freedom even though are opposed to each 
other and each calls for the decline of the other, yet, both, are 
held necessary and supplementary to each other in a way. S imon 
pointed out the necessity for authority to humanity. S imon main-
tains that: «it is only by the operation of authority that the per-
son enjoys the benefit of an orderly relation to the c o m m o n good 
understood both with regard to form and with regard to mat-
t e r * . 8 4 O f course we cannot rule out the abuse of authority in 
certain circumstances, for example, political authority which at 
times subserves public power to private interest of men w h o hold 
p o w e r , yet , the meri t s of au thor i ty out-weigh its demer i t s . 
Authori ty in its essential functions does not conflict with freedom 
rather the more a community is directed toward its c o m m o n 
good and protected from disunity in its c o m m o n action, the more 
perfect and m o r e free it is. There is social happiness when 
freedom and authority are functioning harmoniously. For freedom 
to be realistic, S imon established one fact, that author i ty is 
necessary, an authority which does not meddle with the principle 
of autonomy. 
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